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IMPEACHMENT OF THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT
BY PRIOR CONVICTIONS
In the century since criminal defendants and ex-convicts became competent
witnesses, no distinction has been made between them in most states in establish-
ing criteria for the admissibility of their prior convictions to impeach their credi-
bility.1 As long as a prior conviction has some slight relevance to credibility,
most states will allow its admission. When the witness is the criminal defendant,
however, the prior conviction which shows the jury that his testimony is not en-
titled to belief will also characterize him as a lawbreaker. There is a risk that the
jury will then assume that he must be guilty of the present charge even though
the other evidence in the case may indicate his innocence. If a defendant is
convicted in this way, he has been denied the due process of law.
Separate laws are needed to govern the admissibility of a criminal defen-
dant's prior convictions in order to protect against this prejudicial effect.2 This
note will propose such a statute. To do this, however, requires an understanding
of the two criteria upon which such a statute must be based. Therefore, the first
section explores relevance and the second deals with due process.
I. Relevance
Since the purpose of impeachment is to test credibility, only convictions
indicating a lack of truthfulness should be relevant. Although this has been the
general position of the model codes, it has not been the traditional approach
taken by the states in isolating the relevant convictions; nor has it been the ap-
proach taken by the new Federal Rules of Evidence. This section will first con-
sider the traditional state approaches, then discuss the model codes, and con-
clude with an analysis of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
A. Traditional Approaches
In devising criteria for determining which convictions are relevant for im-
peachment, most states have either allowed all convictions to be used for this
purpose or have divided convictions into categories such as felonies, infamous
crimes, and crimes involving moral turpitude. They then allow the use of crimes
within the defined categories for impeachment and prohibit the use of all other
convictions.
One means of avoiding the difficult decisions involved in ascertaining which
convictions are relevant to truthfulness is to treat all convictions as relevant and,
therefore, admissible.8 Such an approach allows introduction of the fact that
1 Each of the following state codes is applicable to all witnesses and has been interpreted
as applying to the defendant in a criminal case. IowA CoDe § 622.17 (1971); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 25-1214 (1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-54 ( 1 969); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 381 (Supp. 1974);
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 9-17-15 (1970); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-1 (1953).
2 A few states have enacted such laws. PA. STAT. tit. 19, § 711 (1936); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-421 (1964); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 621-22 (Supp. 1973).
3 The Minnesota statute on this subject does not restrict the convictions which are ad-
missible for impeachment purposes. MINN. STAT. § 595.07 (Supp. 1974). In a recent case
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the defendant "slugged somebody in a bar 10 years ago" even though the con-
viction in no way reflects upon his credibility.4
1. The Felony-Misdemeanor Distinction
Through legislative action or judicial decision, most states have limited
admissibility in an attempt to keep out irrelevant convictions. Some allow the
introduction of all felony convictions and prohibit the introduction of mis-
demeanors.' The merit of this approach is that it recognizes a distinction be-
tween relevant and irrelevant convictions, but it errs in its premise that the out-
rageous acts, called felonies, are indicative of a bad character which affects credi-
bility.6 Not every felon is by the fact of being a felon untruthful, although he
may obviously have a "bad" character. Likewise, every misdemeanant is not
truthful and certain misdemeanor convictions may in fact indicate untruthful-
ness.' The task of courts and legislatures should be to isolate the convictions,
felony or misdemeanor, which do reflect untruthfulness and devise a standard
which reflects that fact.
2. Infamous Crimes
A few states have attempted this by limiting impeachment to convictions
of infamous crimes on the apparent theory that one who was so morally deadened
as to commit such a crime would not hesitate to commit perjury.3 The problem
with this standard is that there exists no consensus on what constitutes an in-
famous crime.9 It, therefore, provides only a limited guideline to common
understanding and has consequently been followed in few states.
3. Moral Turpitude
A number of states have adopted a standard of impeachment by crimes
involving moral turpitude. Some states have used moral turpitude as the sole
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a misdemeanor not affecting credibility could be
used to impeach. State v. Bond, 285 Minn. 291, 173 N.W.2d 347 (1969). A similar standard
has been achieved in Louisiana. LA. Rxv. SWAT. § 15:495 (Supp. 1952); State v. Rossi, 273
So. 2d 265 (La. 1973).
4 120 CONG. Rpm. H553 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974) (remarks of Congressman Dennis).
5 IowA CODE § 622.17 (1971); N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 16:33 (1955); State v. Walking
Bull, 86 S.D. 6, 190 N.W.2d 121 (1971).
6 This premise was supported in the House debates in an attempt to persuade the House
to adopt the felony standard. 120 CONG. REc. H552 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974) (remarks of
Congressman Hogan).
7 A readily apparent example is a misdemeanor conviction for lying to a federal grandjury.
8 Illinois achieved this standard by judicial interpretation of its statute which on its face
appears to allow the use of any conviction for impeachment purposes. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
155-1 (1973); People v. Parks, 321 II. 143, 151 N.E. 563 (1926).
9 The United States Supreme Court defined it as a crime punishable by imprisonment
in a penitentiary. Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348 (1886). Illinois has solved the
problem by passage of a statute defining infamous crimes as "arson, bigamy, bribery, burglary,
deviate sexual assault, forgery, incest or aggravated incest, indecent liberties with a child,
kidnaping or aggravated kidnaping, murder, perjury, rape, robbery, sale of narcotic drugs,
subornation of perjury, and theft if the punishment imposed is imprisonment in the pen-
itentiary." ILL,. RyV. STAT. ch. 38, § 124-1 (1973).
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standard of admissibility,1" while others have used this standard for misdemeanors
and allowed the use of all felony convictions to impeach." Since moral turpitude
focuses on the character of the criminal more than on the seriousness of the
offense, it is a better standard for determining admissibility than infamous crime.
However, moral turpitude also needs more precise definition to be an acceptable
standard. Indeed, state courts have failed to define it in a manner to make it a
relevant limitation in practice.12
B. Modern Code Standards
The primary failure of the traditional standards discussed in the previous
section is that, even after all ambiguities and definitional problems are resolved,
the standards do not draw a line between convictions relevant to credibility and
those which are irrelevant. Instead they rest upon the presumption that any
criminal conviction indicates lack of credibility.
The American Law Institute recognized this fact when it drafted Rule 106
of the Model Code of Evidence:
(1) Subject to Paragraphs (2) and (3), for the purpose of impairing or
supporting the credibility of a witness, any party including the party calling
him may examine him and introduce extrinsic evidence concerning any
conduct by him and any other matter relevant upon the issue of his credi-
bility as a witness... except that extrinsic evidence shall be inadmissible...
(b) of his convictions of crime not involving dishonesty or false state-
ment, .. .13
The Advisory Committee which actually drafted the rule recognized it as a
departure from existing law but believed the departure was necessary to limit
impeachment "to matters having to do rather directly with credibility, because
evidence of bad character in other respects is of little weight and likely to be
misused."' 4
The Model Code failed to influence reform in the states until after the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws incorporated the same standard more
succinctly and with more clarity into their Uniform Rules of Evidence. Rule
21 provides:
10 Peck v. State, 86 Tenn. 259, 6 S.W. 389 (188); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1608
(1973); GA. Con § 38-1804 (1972).
11 Wilson v. State, 398 S.W.2d 291 (Tex Grim. App. 1965); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 381
(Supp. 1974).
12 Texas courts have been involved in a lengthy process of determining on a case-by-case
basis which crimes involve moral turpitude. Moral turpitude has been found in cattle theft,
Penix v. State, 488 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Grim. App. 1972); issuing a worthless check, Mahaffey
v. State, 471 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Grim. App. 1971); procuring customers for a prostitute, Taylor
v. State, 470 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); and joyriding, Valdez v. State, 462
S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Grim. App. 1970). Tennessee has found moral turpitude in crimes of
burglary and larceny, Pique v. State, 499 S.W.2d 4 (Tenn. Grim. App. 1973); and shoplifting,
Johnson v. State, 456 S.W.2d 864 (Tenn. Grim. App. 1970). However it is not involved in
driving while intoxicated, Fee v. State, 497 S.W.2d 748 (Tenn. Grim. App. 1973) ; or carrying
a pistol, State v. Solomon, 489 S.W.2d 547 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
13 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106.
14 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE rule 106, Comment b.
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Evidence of the conviction of a witness for a crime not involving dishonesty
or false statement shall be inadmissible for the purpose of impairing his
credibility .... 15
The drafters of the Uniform Rules gave no more justification for this rule than
that it is a logical limitation on evidence of convictions for impeachment pur-
poses.1
8
Only Kansas and the Virgin Islands have enacted the Uniform Rules of
Evidence as a substitute for their previous codes of evidence, while California and
New Jersey have enacted codes based substantially on the Uniform Rules of
Evidence."' The effect of the Model Code and Uniform Rules has therefore been
largely confined to legal thinking rather than practical reform.
C. The Federal Rules Standard
While the previous attempts to codify and reform the law of evidence have
had limited impact on the states' codes of evidence, the Federal Rules of Evidence
will probably have a much greater and longer lasting impact. There are two
reasons to anticipate this widespread impact. One is that the rules apply to the
United States District Courts sitting in every state. Thus, members of the bar
in every state will quickly become familiar with the federal rules and will be
influenced by them in pressing for change of their own state rules. The second
reason is that the Federal Rules of Evidence have been in the process of formu-
lation for nearly a decade and those proposals at greatest variance with existing
state standards have been the subject of widespread debate. These policy de-
bates will surely influence the courts or legislature of any state which contem-
plates changing its existing rules of evidence."'
Because of the variety of state standards on impeachment by prior convic-
tions, Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the impeachment rule, has
been one of the rules most frequently amended in both the Advisory Committee
and congressional stages of its formulation.
Rule 609 was first promulgated by the Advisory Committee in its March,
1969, draft in the following language:
Rule 609 (a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility
of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible
but only if the crime, (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, or (2)
involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment 9 (em-
phasis added).
The Advisory Committee reasoned that a "demonstrated instance of willingness
15 UNIFORM RULES OF EVDENCE rule 21.
16 UNFORM RuLms OF EVmENcE rule 21, Comments.
17 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CoMmssSION-Rs ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS 369 (1973).
18 New Mexico has enacted the federal rules of evidence in the form they were drafted by
the Advisory Committee. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-4-101 to 20-4-1102 (1973), see specifically §
20-4-609.
19 120 CoNo. REc. H309 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1974) (remarks of Congressman Hogan).
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to engage in conduct in disregard of accepted patterns is translatable into willing-
ness to give false testimony."2
This standard was the one incorporated in the final Advisory Committee
draft of 1971.21 By then, the Committee had an additional reason for adhering
to the standard for it had been adopted by Congress in its 1970 amendments to
the District of Columbia Code.22
No substantive changes affecting the relevancy standard of Rule 609 were
adopted until the House Judiciary Committee, which held no public hearings
on the Federal Rules of Evidence, adopted a new formulation of Rule 609:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he
has been convicted of a crime is admissible only if the crime involved dis-
honesty or false statement. 2
Although the Committee was primarily motivated by the due process problems
of unfair prejudice and deterrence to the defendant's willingness to take the
stand, it recognized that its proposed standard limited admissibility "to those
kinds of convictions bearing directly on credibility, i.e., crimes involving dishonesty
or false statement."24 This standard in fact is that of the Model Code and Uni-
form Rules. 5
In debate on the floor of the House of Representatives, an attempt was made
to return to the original Advisory Committee standard with the argument that:
[t]he character of a witness is material circumstantial evidence on the ques-
tion of the veracity of the witness. Prior criminal conduct, including all
prior felony convictions, is relevant evidence of such character.... This is
not to say that people with criminal records necessarily lie, but it is to say
that juries should weigh the criminal record in determining credibility.-
This recurring premise that all evidence of bad character as manifested through
prior convictions is relevant to credibility was rebutted as it had been by the
drafters of the Uniform Rules by a resort to logic:
What we have done in the committee is the logical thing.... We have
said that, for the purpose of attacking credibility of a witness, evidence that
he has been convicted of a crime is admissible only if the crime involved
dishonesty or false statement. In other words, if it in fact did bear on his
credibility.
27
During the House debate it became clear that the scope of the term "dishonesty"
20 Id., at H130.
21 Id.
22 D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 (Supp. 1970). These amendments were in response to the
decision in Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
23 120 CONG. REc. H310 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1974) (remarks of Congressman Hogan).
24 H.R. REP1. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1973).
25 Codes cited notes 13 and 15 supra, with accompanying text.
26 120 CONG. REO. H552 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974) (remarks of Congressman Hogan).
27 120 CONG. Rnc. H553 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974) (remarks of Congressman Dennis).
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was ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. 8 However, the attempt
to amend Rule 609 on the House floor failed and the House enacted the standard
of relevance originated in the Model Code of Evidence."
The Senate Judiciary Committee formulated separate rules within Rule
609(a) for the criminal defendant and the nondefendant witness.30 For the
defendant, it retained the House version which allowed use of convictions for
crimes involving dishonesty and false statement alone, while it permitted im-
peachment of other witnesses by felony convictions if in the judge's discretion
their probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect.3 1
Senator McClellan proposed the following amendment to Rule 609 on the
Senate floor:
General Rule-For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited
from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if
the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year
under the law under which he was convicted or (2) involved dishonesty or
false statement, regardless of the punishment.3 2
The amendment was offered for the express purpose of returning Rule 609 to
the form it had when it was formulated by the Advisory Committee and to con-
form the federal standard to the standard Congress enacted for the District of
Columbia in 1970. s s The amendment was initially defeated by a tie vote of
35-35.* However, after the Senate voted to reconsider its vote, the amendment
was passed by a vote of 38-3325 With this form of Rule 609, the rules passed the
Senate without a dissenting vote. 6
Since the House and Senate had passed different versions of certain rules,
including Rule 609, a Conference Committee devised the following compromise:
General Rule-For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited
from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only
if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one
year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines
that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, re-
gardless of the punishment.3 7
28 Congressman Danielson felt that dishonesty must include all the theft offenses while
Congressman Dennis felt it was limited to crimes of perjury, false pretense, and fraud. 120
CoNG. REc. H556 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974). The problem was given little discussion, however,
which indicates the courts will eventually have to resolve the question of the scope of the
term. A better solution would be a statutory definition similar to the Illinois statutory defini-
tion of the term "infamous crime." Note 9, supra.
29 120 CONG. Rzc. H557 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
30 S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
31 120 CONG. REc. S19,910 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1974) (remarks of Senator Hart).
32 120 CoNG. REc. S19,908 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1974) (remarks of Senator McClellan).
33 Id.
34 120 CoNG. REc. S19,912 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1974).
35 Id. at S19,915.
36 Id., at S19,916.
37 H.R. Rap. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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This compromise passed the Senate and the House, and with the President's
signature it became law on January 2, 19 75.S By its terms the rules of evidence
are to become effective 180 days thereafter.
II. Due Process
Determining which convictions are relevant to credibility should only be the
first step in determining admissibility when the witness is the criminal defendant.
The Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a trial in accordance with
due process of law.3" Due process has been held to include the right of an accused
to testify in his own behalf4" and the right to be presumed innocent with the
burden on the government to prove its case against him. 1 Allowing the admission
of even relevant convictions such as for filing a fraudulent income tax return can
have one of two adverse effects on an accused's rights to due process. In the first
instance, the accused may forego the right to testify, thereby keeping from the
jury evidence favorable to his defense that only he can provide. On the other
hand, if he does testify, the jury upon learning of his past conviction may con-
clude that he is a criminal and should therefore be convicted even though the
evidence in the case could not of itself persuade the jury that the defendant was
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That this does happen has been recognized
by those seeking reform in this area:
[W]e take the position in this country that we are trying a man for the crime
with which he is charged and that we have to have evidence of his guilt
of that crime; that we do not convict him and send him to the penitentiary
simply because he is a generally bad character. Yet, in most States we allow
him to be asked about prior convictions if he has the hardihood to take the
witness stand on the theory that this reflects upon his credibility ... [W]e
get down to the place where we are really convicting the man because of bad
character, which we say we do not do .... 2
The traditional approach to solving this conflict between the admission of
relevant evidence and the dictates of due process has been the limiting instruction
to the jury." However, this permits the jury to hear evidence damaging to the
accused's presumption of innocence upon the specious theory that they will not
consider the evidence at the time they finally determine the accused's guilt or
innocence. Such objectivity is rarely attained by human nature. The only value
of the limiting instruction is that it allows preservation of the form of due process
after the substance has been destroyed. Between the use of a limiting instruction
and a total ban on the use .of prior conviction against a criminal defendant, the
states have used at least three intermediate methods to control the admission of
relevant convictions.
38 Pub. L. No. 93-595 (Jan. 2, 1975).
39 U.S. CONST. amend. V, U.S. GONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
40 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897).
41 United States v. Bobbitt, 450 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
42 120 CONG. REc. H315 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1974) (remarks of Congressman Dennis).
43 Davis v. State, 171 Neb. 333, 106 N.W.2d 490 '(1960).
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A. Objective Limitations
Objective limitations are those which consider not the nature of the im-
peaching crime but an external feature, such as its age, in determining its ad-
missibility. The premise is that although a conviction is relevant to honesty or
truthfulness it should not be used to impeach because its use would be highly
prejudicial or otherwise violative of public policy. Thus, a conviction for perjury
which is 35 years old is relevant to the accused's credibility, but its remoteness
is such that its relevance is outweighed by the risk that it will convict the de-
fendant in violation of due process.
The remoteness limitation has been one of the most widely used." The chief
difference between the states relying upon it has been the length of elapsed time
which will bar admission45 and whether it is measured from the time of conviction
or release from confinement." Although some states prohibit the use of juvenile
convictions,47 other states permit their introduction," while still others allow their
introduction in limited circumstances.49 Another objective limitation prohibits the
use of convictions for which a pardon has been granted.5" Some states also forbid
the use of convictions on which an appeal is pending," although in other states
such convictions are admissible with the fact of the appeal introduced to affect the
weight to be given the conviction.52
Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence contains all these limitations.
44 Bowie v. State, 494 P.2d 800 (Alas. 1972); State v. Van Beek, - S.D. -, 211 N.W.2d
355 (1973); Stewart v. State, 503 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); McDonald v. State,
489 P.2d 776 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 233, § 21 (1932); ME. Ray.
STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 56 (Supp. 1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1608 (1973).
45 Texas law provides for a 10-year limitation, Stewart v. State, 503 S.W.2d 286 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1973); Vermont, 15 years, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1608 (1973); and Massa-
chusetts, five years for a misdemeanor and 10 years for a felony, MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 233,§ 21 (1932).
46 Texas measures from the date of release from confinement and requires a ten-year period
free from any incarceration to cut off any prior convictions. Stewart v. State, 503 S.W.2d 286
(Tex. Crim. App. 1973). In Texas a 1945 conviction could be used to impeach a defendant if
he was released from custody on the conviction in 1956, was convicted on a second charge in
1965, and is standing trial on a third charge at the present time. The Vermont statute, how-
ever, appears to incorporate an absolute cutoff fifteen years after the conviction regardless of
the defendanes subsequent conviction record. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1608 (1973). The
merit of this latter position is its recognition that the conviction not the sentence is the relevant
factor and that keeping alive of old convictions for the purpose of impeachment has a cumula-
tive effect more likely to prejudice the jury than would limiting impeachment to more recent
convictions.
47 Lineback v. State, - Ind. -, 301 N.E.2d 636 (1973); State v. Broxton, 49 N.J.
373, 230 A.2d 489 (1967).
48 Tarrants v. State, 236 So. 2d 360 (Miss. 1970).
49 North Carolina permits the use of juvenile convictions to impeach only if the same
conduct would be criminal in an adult. Thus, a juvenile adjudication for theft would be ad-
missible, but a curfew violation would not. State v. Miller, 281 N.C. 70, 187 S.E.2d 729
(1972). Oklahoma and West Virginia permit the use of convictions as a juvenile if the con-
viction was in adult court after waiver by the juvenile authorities. Curtis v. State, 518 P.2d
1288 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974); State v. Thomas, - W. Va. -, 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974).
50 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-4-609 (Supp. 1973); Nnv. REv. STAT. § 50.095 (1973).
Illinois permits the use of convictions on which -a pardon has been granted. People v. Andrae,
295 Ill. 445, 129 N.E. 178 (1920); in fact, evidence that the pardon has been given can be
excluded, Gallagher v. People, 211 Ill. 158, 71 N.E. 842 (1904).
51 State v. Blevins, 425 S.W.2d 155 (Mo. 1968); Adlns v. Commonwealth, 309 S.W.2d
165 (Ky. App. 1958).
52 Nicholson v. State, 254 So. 2d 881 (Miss. 1971); People v. Bey, 42 Ill. 2d 139, 246
N.E.2d 287 (1969); McCoy v. State, 466 S.W.2d 540 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
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Rule 609 (b) prohibits the use of a conviction that is more than 10 years old.
unless the court determines in the interests of justice that the probative value of
a conviction more than 10 years old outweighs its prejudicial effect. The 10
years is measured from the date of conviction or the date of release from confine-
ment, whichever is later. A subsequent conviction does not keep a conviction
admissible beyond the 10-year limit 3
Rule 609(c) prohibits the use of a conviction for which a person has been
pardoned or for which rehabilitation is shown unless the person is subsequently
convicted of another felony."
Rule 609(d) prohibits the use of juvenile convictions to impeach a de-
fendant although these adjudications may be used against a nondefendant wit-
ness in a criminal case.5
On the use of convictions upon which appeal is pending, Rule 609(e) per-
mits their admission with the fact that appeal is pending presented to the jury in
order that the jury may assess the weight to give the convictions.
Although the objective limitations protect an accused's due process rights,
they do not go far enough. An adult conviction of recent origin could still be so
prejudicial in its effect that the accused's right to a fair trial would be jeopardized
if the conviction were to be offered into evidence.
B. Judicial Discretion
Rather than relying merely on objective limitations which may not be en-
tirely adequate, many states have relied upon judicial discretion to control the
admissibility of relevant convictions which might be unduly prejudicial to the ac-
cused.5" In recent times, this doctrine has been known as the Luck doctrine after
the District of Columbia case, Luck v. United States5 s which recognized its ex-
istence in the District of Columbia. Luck was convicted of burglary after his past
convictions were admitted for impeachment purposes. In reversing the convic-
tion, the Court of Appeals determined that admission of the prior convictions
had been unduly prejudicial and that the trial judge could have excluded them
from evidence since the statute governing their admission used the permissive
"may be given in evidence" rather than the mandatory "shall. " "
53 Pub. L. No. 93-595 (Jan. 2, 1975).
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 People v. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1 (1972); People v.
Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971); State v. Martin, 217 N.W.2d 536 (Iowa
1974); People v. Dye, 356 Mich. 271, 96 N.W.2d 788 (1959); State v. Mann, 112 N.H. 412,
297 A.2d 664 (1972); a few states have forbidden the judge to use his discretion to keep out
convictions which are admissible under the statute or prior decisions. State v. Hawthorne, 49
N.J. 130, 228 A.2d 682 (1967); State v. Bitting, 162 Conn. 1, 291 A.2d 240 (1971). Min-
nesota has held that the discretion is in the prosecutor. Once he decides to use a conviction to
impeach, the trial judge has no discretion to bar its admission. State v. West, 285 Minn. 188,
173 N.W.2d 468 (1969).
58 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
59 Id. at 768, citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 (1961): "No person shall be incompetent
to testify, in either civil or criminal proceedings, by reason of his having been convicted of
crime, but such fact may be given in evidence to affect his credit as a witness.. . ' (Emphasis
added by court.)
[Apri 1975]
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Although the original draft of the Federal Rules did not include a judicial
discretion standard, the second draft of Rule 609 (a) did include such a standard
precisely so that the federal rules would be in harmony with Luck. However,
Congress in 1970 had already repealed the Luck doctrine through amendment df
the District of Columbia Code. When the Advisory Committee learned of this,
it returned Rule 609 (a) to its previous form in order to comport with congres-
sional intent.60
Although judicial discretion appears to be an attractive approach to the
problem, its principal handicap is that it does not give an accused notice in ad-
vance whether his convictions will be used against him. Instead, it is only after
running the risk by testifying that he learns the answer. Therefore, he cannot
weigh wisely the advantages and disadvantages of taking the stand when reach-
ing a decision on that question. "It leaves it all up to the discretion of the judge
without any rule."6
1
C. Defendant Control
Rather than leaving the decision on admissibility up to the judge's determi-
nation, a small number of jurisdictions allow the defendant himself to determine
whether he will be impeached or not by his prior convictions. The first such en-
actment occurred in England. The Criminal Evidence Act of 189862 allowed the
admission of prior convictions of the accused only if he attempted to establish
his own good character, sought to impugn the character of prosecution witnesses,
or testified against any other person charged with the same offense.
The Model Code of Evidence Rule 106 and Uniform Rule of Evidence
Rule 21 took an even more restricted approach. Prior convictions could not be
used unless the accused introduced evidence for the sole purpose of supporting
his credibility. The motivation for the drafters choosing this standard was com-
pliance with the requirements of due process.6" Kansas adopted this standard by
statute."' More recently, the Supreme Court of Hawaii adopted this standard in
State v. Santiago.0' The court perceived this approach as mandated by the
due process requirement. 6 The law at the time Santiago was tried permitted im-
peachment of all witnesses by prior convictions whenever they took the stand."'
This was held to be unconstitutional where the witness was also the accused. As
a result, the Hawaii legislature passed a statute in 1972 which treats the accused
differently than other witnesses and allows him to be impeached by prior
convictions only if he introduces testimony solely to support his credibility. s
60 Hearings on H.5463 Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2, at 29 (1973).
61 120 CoNG. REc. H556 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974) (remarks of Congressman Dennis).
62 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36, § I (f).
63 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106, Comment on para. 3.
64 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-421 (1964).
65 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971).
66 Id. at 661.
67 "A witness may be questioned as to whether he has been convicted of any indictable
or other offense; and upon being so questioned if he either denies the fact or refuses to answer
it shall be lawful for the party questioning to prove the conviction." HAWAII Rnv. STAT. § 222-
22 (1955).
68 ".... [In a criminal case where the defendant takes the stand, the defendant may not
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The approach taken by jurisdictions which allow the defendant to control by
the substance his own testimony whether his prior convictions will be admitted
against him ensures greater adherence to the substance of due process; it assures
the defendant that he can testify in his own defense without running the risk that
his prior convictions will convict him.
III. Conclusion
A variety of approaches have been undertaken in handling the problem of
impeachment by prior convictions when the witness being impeached is the
criminal defendant. However, none of these attempts to deal with the problem
has attained the ideal standard of satisfying both relevancy and due process.
Further reform in this matter should be along the lines of the following proposal:
§ 1 The testimony of the defendant in a criminal prosecution shall not
be impeached by evidence of his prior convictions for crime unless he first
introduces evidence for the sole purpose of supporting his credibility as a
witness. Prior convictions which may be used to impeach under this section
shall be limited to those for offenses involving theft, larceny, deceit, fraud,
perjury, or false statement, whether denominated as felonies or misdemeanors.
§2 No conviction obtained more than ten years previous to trial shall be
used to impeach, regardless of the length of time which has elapsed since
the defendant's release from custody on such prior conviction.
§3 No conviction obtained while the defendant was a juvenile shall be used
to impeach him in a criminal prosecution.
§4 No conviction for which a pardon, annulment or certificate of rehabili-
tation has been issued shall be used to impeach the defendant in a criminal
prosecution.
§5 No conviction shall be used to impeach the defendant in a criminal
prosecution unless all direct appeals have first been exhausted or the time
for direct appeal has elapsed.
Until such a standard is universally enacted, the uncertainties a criminal de-
fendant faces when deciding whether to take the stand and the danger of ex-
treme prejudice that follows once he does take the stand will remain. Although
final enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence may well bring further reform
in this area to an end for the foreseeable future, there are aspects of impeachment
by prior convictions which still require clarification. Hopefully, the next wave of
law reform will address itself to these problems.
Jack S. Penca
be questioned or evidence introduced as to whether he has been convicted of any indictable or
other offense unless the defendant has himself introduced testimony for the sole purpose of
establishing his credibility as a witness. . ." -IAwArr REv. STAT. § 621-22 (1972).
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